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Abstract.  Reciprocal  feedback  distorts  the  production  and  content  of  reputation 
information, hampering trust and trade efficiency. Data from eBay and other sources 
combined with laboratory data provide a robust picture of how reciprocity can be 
guided  by  changes  in  the  way  feedback  information  flows  through  the  system, 
leading to more accurate reputation information, more trust and more efficient trade. 
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I.  Introduction 
This paper reports on the  repair of an Internet  market trust  mechanism. While  all markets 
require some minimum amount of trust (Akerlof, 1970), it is a particular challenge for Internet 
markets, where trading is typically anonymous, geographically dispersed, and executed sequentially. 
To  incentivize  trustworthiness,  Internet  markets  commonly  employ  reputation-based  „feedback 
systems‟ that enable traders to publicly post information about past transaction partners. Online 
markets with this kind of feedback system include eBay.com, Amazon.com, and RentACoder.com, 
among many others. For these markets, feedback systems with their large databases of transaction 
histories are a core asset, crucial for market efficiency and user loyalty.  
Engineering  studies  examine  institutional  design  problems  at  a  fine-grained  level.  They 
constitute a unique kind of testing ground for existing concepts and for identifying new questions 
for economic theory.
1 In the present case, economic theory implies that a  reputation system that 
elicits accurate and complete feedback information can promote trust and cooperation among 
selfish traders even in such adverse environments as online market platforms.
2 So there is theoretical 
reason to believe that a properly designed feedback system can  effectively facilitate trade. At the 
same time, the nature of the problem takes us further down the causation chain than received theory 
presently goes, to gaming in the production of reputation information. In essence, reputation builders 
retaliate in-kind for a negative review, thereby inhibiting the provision of negative reviews in the first 
place. The resulting  bias in  reputation  information then works its way  up the  chain, ultimately 
diminishing market efficiency. Other reputation-based systems are open to similar retaliation (ex., 
financial  rating  services,  employee  job  assessments,  word-of-mouth  about  colleagues),  so  the 
phenomenon likely has a life beyond Internet markets. 
Below we present new data from the eBay marketplace exhibiting a strong and general reciprocal 
pattern in the content, timing and quantity of reputation information (Section II). It turns out that 
the institutional trigger for this behavior is the timing and posting rules governing feedback giving. 
The natural approach to fixing the problem then is to change these rules to diminish reciprocal 
behavior. Doing so involved two large uncertainties. First, it was not clear how responsive the 
                                                 
1 Roth (2002) argues the need for a literature “to further the design and maintenance of markets and other economic 
institutions [p. 1341]” and provides examples of how this literature can help shape new questions in economic theory. 
To date, the market design literature has focused mostly on allocation mechanisms such as auctions and matching. Roth 
(2008) reviews the literature on matching markets, Milgrom (2004) the literature on auction markets, and Ockenfels, 
Reiley, and Sadrieh (2006) the literature specific to Internet auctions.  
2 See, for example, Wilson (1985) and, for the literature specific to feedback systems, Dellarocas (2006). 2 
system  would  be:  In  order  to  influence  trade,  the  new  system  need  evoke  subtle,  strategically 
motivated  changes  in  the  behavior  of  the  traders,  at  multiple  points,  as  the  information  flows 
through the market. Second, changing the feedback rules risks undesirable side effects, as reciprocal 
feedback  has  positive,  as  well  as  negative  consequences.  Most  critically,  reciprocity  appears 
important to getting (legitimately) satisfactory trades reported; eliminating this kind of reciprocity 
might lead to a system that over reports, rather than under reports, negative outcomes.  
With these considerations in mind, our study examines two alternative proposals (also Section 
II).
3 Analyzing data from other Internet markets that have feedback systems with features similar to 
those proposed suffices to answer some of our questions  (Section III). But not all of them. There 
are behavioral and institutional differences across the markets we examine and this leaves substantial 
ambiguity; one proposal, in particular, has major features not shared with any existing market. Also, 
we lack field data on the underlying cost and preference parameters in the markets, and  so cannot 
easily  measure how  feedback systems affect market efficiency.   To  narrow the  uncertainty, we 
complement the field data with a test bed experiment crafted to capture the theoretically relevant 
aspects of behavior and institutional changes (Section IV).
4  
In combination, the field and lab data provide a robust picture of how reciprocity can be guided 
through the design of information channels. We will see that more accurate information sets off an 
endogenous shift in the market,  leading to greater trust and trustworthiness , and more efficient 
trade.  Our  analysis guided eB ay in its decision to change the reputation system .  We present 
preliminary data on how the new field system performs (Section V). We conclude with lessons for 
market design and future theory building (Section VI). 
 
II. The feedback problem and two proposals to fix it 
In this section we first review eBay‟s conventional feedback system (Subsection II.1). We then 
examine evidence, from new data as well as from the work of other researchers, for a reciprocal 
pattern in feedback giving and for the role of the rules that govern feedback giving (Subsection II.2). 
                                                 
3 A number of others proposals were considered but discarded relatively quickly in favor of the two discussed here. 
4 Test bed experiments to get insight into how a market redesign will work has been done in relation to allocation 
mechanisms; for example,  Grether, Isaac, and Plott (1981), Kagel and Roth (2000), Chen (2005), Kwasnica, Ledyard, 
Porter, and DeMartini (2005), Chen and Sönmez (2006) and Brunner, Goeree, Holt, and Ledyard (forthcoming). 3 
An important point will be that reciprocal behavior has good as well as bad consequences for the 
system. We then discuss two proposals put forward to mitigate the problem (Subsection II.3).
 5 
 
II.1  EBay’s conventional feedback system  
EBay facilitates trade in the form of auctions and posted offers in over thirty countries.
6 After 
each eBay transaction, both the buyer and the seller are invited to give feedback on each other. Until 
spring 2007, when eBay changed the system, only “conventional” feedback could be left. In the 
conventional feedback system, a trader can rate a transaction positive, neutral, or negative (along 
with  a  text  comment).  Submitted  feedback  is  immediately  posted  and  available  to  all  traders. 
Conventional feedback ratings can be removed from the site only by court ruling, or if the buyer did 
not pay, or if both transaction partners mutually agree to withdrawal.
7  
The most common summary measure of an eBay t rader‟s feedback history is the feedback score, 
equal to the difference between the number of positive and negative feedbacks from unique eBay 
traders  (neutral  scores  are  ignored).  Each  trader‟s  feedback  score  is  provided  on  the  site.  An 
important advantage of the feedback score is that it incorporates a reliability measure (experience) in 
the measure of trustworthiness. The feedback score is also the most commonly used measure of 
feedback history in research analyses of eBay data.
8 
 
II.2  Reciprocal feedback  
Feedback  information  is  largely  a  public  good,  helping  other  traders  to  manage  the  risks 
involved in trusting unknown transaction partners. Yet our data finds that about 70% of the traders 
                                                 
5  That  said,  many  (but  not  all)  studies  find  that  feedback  has  positive  value  for  traders  as  indicated  by  positive 
correlations between the feedback score of a seller and the revenue and the probability of sale. See, for example, Bajari 
and Hortaçsu (2003, 2004), Ba and Pavlou (2002), Cabral and Hortaçsu (forthcoming), Dellarocas (2004), Dewan and 
Hsu (2001), Eaton (2007), Ederington and Dewally (2006), Houser and Wooders (2005), Jin and Kato (forthcoming), 
Kalyanam and McIntyre (2001), Livingston (2005), Livingston and Evans (2004), Lucking-Reiley, Bryan, Prasad, and 
Reeves (2007), McDonald and Slawson (2002), Melnik and Alm (2002), Ockenfels (2003), Resnick  and Zeckhauser 
(2002),  and  Resnick,  Zeckhauser,  Swanson,  and  Lockwood  (2006).  See  Ba  and  Pavlou  (2002),  Bolton,  Katok,  and 
Ockenfels (2004, 2005), and Bolton and Ockenfels (forthcoming) for laboratory evidence. 
6 In 2006, 82 million users bought or sold $52 billion in goods on eBay platforms.  
7 EBay‟s old feedback system was the product of an 11 year evolutionary process. In its first version, introduced in 1996, 
feedback was not bound to mutual transactions: every community member could give an opinion about every other 
community member. In 1999/2000 the ability to submit non-transaction related feedback was removed. The percentage 
of positive feedback was introduced in 2003, and in 2004 the procedure of mutual feedback withdrawal was added. Since 
2005, feedback submitted by eBay users leaving the platform shortly thereafter or not participating in „issue resolution 
processes‟ is made ineffective, and members who want to leave neutral or negative feedback must go through a tutorial 
before being able to do so. Since spring 2007 a new system was introduced, as described in Section V. In 2008, again 
new features were implemented, which are analyzed in Bolton, Greiner and Ockenfels (2009). 
8 Another common measure is the „percentage positive‟ equal to the share of positive and negative feedbacks that is 
positive. For our data, which measure is used seems to make little difference; we mostly report results using the feedback 
score. 4 
leave  feedback  (a  number  consistent  with  previous  research).
9  In this subsection, we  examine 
evidence that reciprocity plays a role in the giving as well as timing and content of eBay feedback. In 
the following,  the null hypothesis is always that feedback is given independently, whereas the 
alternative hypothesis states that feedback is given conditionally, following a reciprocal pattern.
10 
The analysis is based on 700,000 completed eBay transactions taken from seven countries and six 
categories in 2006/07 (Dataset 1, Appendix A.1). 
Feedback giving. If feedback were given independently among trading partners, one would expect the 
percentage of time both partners give feedback to be about 70%*70% = 49%. Yet mutual feedback 
is given much more often, about 64% of the time. The reason is evident from the top rows of Table 
1: Both buyers and sellers are more likely to provide feedback when the transaction partner has 
given feedback first. The effect is stronger for sellers than for buyers; when a buyer gives feedback, 
the seller leaves feedback 87.4% of the time, versus 51.4% when the buyer does not leave feedback 
(in a moment we will see that sellers sometimes have an incentive to wait). A common buying 
experience on eBay, after a transaction has gone smoothly, is to receive a note from the seller saying 
he gave you positive feedback and asking you to provide feedback, or saying that he would give you 
feedback once you left feedback on him (playing or initiating a kind of ”trust game”). Indeed, the 
evidence suggests that this kind of reciprocal behavior is an effective tactic for reputation building. 
Feedback content. Also observe from Table 1 that there is a high positive correlation between buyer 
and seller feedback within all countries sampled. There are probably a number of reasons for this; 
for example, a problematic transaction might leave both sides dissatisfied. But Table 1 also provides 
a  first  hint  that  reciprocity  in  feedback  content  has  a  strategic  element:  If  feedback  is  given 
independently, the correlation between seller and buyer content, as measured by tau, should be 
about the same when the seller gives second as when the seller gives first. In fact, the correlation is 
about twice as high when the seller gives second. The pattern is similar across countries.  
                                                 
9 The number varies somewhat across categories and countries; see Table 8 in Appendix A.1. Resnick and Zeckhauser 
(2002) found that buyers gave feedback in 51.7% of the cases, and sellers in 60.6%. Cabral and Hortaçsu (forthcoming) 
report a feedback frequency from buyer to seller in 2002/03 of 40.7% in 1,053 auctions of coins, notebooks and Beanie 
Babies. In their 2002 dataset of 51,062 completed rare coin auctions on eBay, Dellarocas and Wood (2008) observed 
feedback frequencies of 67.8% for buyers and 77.5% for sellers.  
10 Others recognized the strategic interdependency of feedback before, including  Resnick, Zeckhauser, Friedman, and 
Kuwabara (2000), Resnick and Zeckhauser (2002), and, more recently, Klein, Lambertz, Spagnolo, and Stahl (2007) and 
Dellarocas and Wood  (2008). In this and parts of the following sections, we  complement this literature from an 
engineering perspective, combining data sets that follow a large set of eBay transactions from their posting until the end 
of their feedback period (both for the time before and after the institutional change discussed here), data  sets from 
various eBay platforms in four continents differing in their feedback institutions, as well  as data sets from reputation 
systems of other Internet market platforms, and from markets implemented in the laboratory  – as further discussed 
below and in the Appendix.  5 
TABLE 1: FEEDBACK GIVING AND CONTENT, CONDITIONAL PROBABILITIES AND CORRELATIONS 
Feedback giving probability  Partner did not yet give FB    Partner gave FB already 
Buyer  68.4%    74.1% 
Seller  51.4%    87.4% 
Kendall’s tau correlations between seller’s and buyer’s feedback     
  FB content correlation   
FB giving 
correlation 
  All cases    Buyer gave 
FB second 
  Seller gave 
FB second 
 
Country  N  tau    N  Tau    N  tau    N  tau 
All  458,249  0.710    139,772  0.348    318,477  0.884    725,735  0.693 
Australia  20,928  0.746    6,040  0.340    14,888  0.928    31,990  0.752 
Belgium  8,474  0.724    3,097  0.464    5,377  0.880    12,301  0.684 
France  24,933  0.727    8,095  0.423    16,838  0.883    39,104  0.703 
Germany  133,957  0.656    45,836  0.331    88,121  0.840    192,565  0.644 
Poland  457  1.000    172  -    285  1.000    1,134  0.783 
U.K.  93,266  0.694    31,316  0.379    61,950  0.875    143,877  0.692 
U.S.  176,009  0.746    45,133  0.313    130,876  0.911    302,213  0.701 
Notes: Observations  where  feedback  was  eventually  withdrawn  are  not  included  in  correlations.  In  the  cell 
marked with “-“, the standard deviation is zero. All other correlations are highly significant. 
 
Feedback timing. If feedback timing were independent among trading partners, one would expect the 
timing of buyer and seller feedback to be uncorrelated with content. But this is not the case: Figure 1 
shows scatter plots for the distribution of feedback timing for those transactions where both traders 
actually left feedback. The green dots represent the timing of mutually positive feedback. More than 
70% of all these observations are located below the 45 degree line, indicating that in most cases the 
seller gives feedback after the buyer. The red dots visualize observations of mutually problematic 
feedback. Here, the sellers‟ feedback is given second in more than 85% of the cases. Moreover, 
mutually  problematic  feedback  is  much  more  heavily  clustered  alongside  the  45  degree  line  as 
compared to the case of mutually positive feedback. The tightness and sequence in timing suggests 
that sellers quickly „retaliate‟ negative feedback.
11  
Seller retaliation also explains why more than 70% of cases in which the buyer gives problematic 
feedback and the seller gives positive feedback  (blue dots in  Figure 1), involve the buyer giving 
second; not doing so would involve a high risk of being retaliated.  Observations in which only the 
seller gives problematic feedback (yellow dots) are rare and have their mass below the 45-degree line. 
 
                                                 
11 The consequences of market timing are a major theme in market design; see, for example, Niederle and Roth (2009) 
and references therein. 6 
FIGURE 1: CONTENT AND TIMING OF MUTUAL FEEDBACK ON EBAY 
 
■ Mutually positive feedback (N=451,227)  ■ Only buyer left problematic feedback (N=2,884) 
■ Mutually problematic feedback (N=5,279)  ■ Only seller left problematic feedback (N=357) 
Notes:  The  scatter  plot  reports  about  460,000  observations  where  both  transaction  partners  gave 
feedback. „Problematic‟ feedback includes neutral or withdrawn feedback.  
 
 
Why do sellers retaliate negative feedback? Existing theory and laboratory studies on reputation 
building, while not developed in the context of the production of reputation information, suggest 
that there are multiple strategic and social motives at work
12 (and these dovetail well with anecdotal 
and  survey  evidence  that  we  have  collected) .  Some  retaliation  is  probably  driven  by   social 
preferences or emotional arousal, e.g., when  a buyer‟s negative feedback is deemed undeserved by 
the seller. Retaliating negative feedback may  also help to deter negative feedback in the future, 
because  retaliation  is  viewable  by  buyers  in  a  seller‟s  feedback  history.  Also,  giving  a  negative 
feedback increases the probability that the opponent will agree to mutually withdraw the feedback. 
                                                 
12 See, e.g., Kreps and Wilson (1982), Milgrom, North, and Weingast (1990), Greif (1989), Camerer and Weigelt (1988), 
Neral and Ochs (1992), Brandts and Figueras (2003), and Bolton et al. (2004) for the strategic role in reciprocity, and 
Fehr and Gächter (2000), as well as the surveys in Cooper and Kagel (forthcoming) and Camerer (2003) for the social 
aspect in reciprocity. 7 
In fact, of the cases where a seller responds to a negative with a negative feedback, about 27% are 
later withdrawn. Yet if the seller gives negative feedback before the buyer‟s negative is posted (and 
so does not retaliate), the percentage of mutual withdrawal is only about 3%, suggesting that non-
retaliatory negative feedback is driven by different motives than retaliatory negative feedback. 
 
II. 3  Two alternative redesign proposals 
Any institutional change in a running market must respect certain path dependencies. This is 
particularly true for reputation systems, which by their nature connect the past with the future. For 
this reason, the redesign proposals we consider maintain (in some form) the conventional ratings of 
the existing system, allowing traders to basically maintain their reputation built before the change. At 
the same time, each proposal attacks one or the other of two features that appear to facilitate 
reciprocal behavior, either the open, sequential posting that allows a trading partner to react to the 
feedback information, or the symmetric nature of the ratings that allows sellers to retaliate buyers. 
Proposal  1.  Make  conventional  feedback  blind.  To  do  so,  conventional  feedback  would  be  given 
simultaneously in the sense that traders cannot see the opponent‟s feedback before leaving one‟s 
own feedback. Traders cannot condition their feedback on the feedback posted by a transaction 
partner, thereby excluding sequential reciprocity and strategic timing, making seller retaliation more 
difficult. The conjecture is that this will lead to more accurate feedback.
13  
A major risk with a blind system concerns whether it will diminish the frequency of feedback 
giving, particularly with regard   to mutually satisfactory transactions.   Because trading partners 
effectively give feedback simultaneously, giving a positive feedback could not be used to induce a 
trading partner to do the same.  
Proposal 2. Add a detailed seller rating (DSR) system to supplement conventional feedback. In principle, a one-
sided system in which only the buyer gives feedback is the surest way to end seller retaliation.
14 But 
while there is more scope for moral hazard on  the seller side than on the buyer side  in eBay‟s 
marketplace,  there  is  some  room  for  buyer  moral  hazard  as  well.
15  Moreover, gaining positive 
                                                 
13 A blind system of this sort has been suggested by Güth, Mengel, and Ockenfels (2007), Reichling (2004) and Klein et 
al. (2007), among others. 
14 A system of this sort has been proposed by Chwelos and Dhar (2007), among others.  These systems share elements 
with a system that strictly separates feedback earned as a seller and feedbac k earned as a buyer, which is discussed and 
experimentally analyzed in Bolton et al. (2009).  
15 While there is little formal evidence at this point for buyer moral hazard on eBay, we collected considerable evidence 
in our surveys with eBay traders conducted jointly with eBay, anecdotal evidence from eBay‟s online feedback forum and 8 
feedback  as  a  buyer  appears  to  be  an  important  step  for  many  traders  in  their  transition  to  a 
successful seller. For these reasons, the proposal was to create a detailed seller rating system to 
supplement  the  conventional  feedback  system:  Conventional  feedback  would  be  published 
immediately, as usual, but the buyer, and only the buyer, can leave additional feedback on the seller 
under blind conditions so that the seller cannot reciprocate them.
16  
A major risk is that the conventional and DSR feedback given to sellers might diverge. Unhappy 
buyers might give positive conventional feedback to avoid seller retaliation, and then be truthful 
with the (blind) DSR  score. This could cause the feedback system scoring to have a new kind of 
credibility problem with traders. 
To summarize this section, people tend to reciprocate the feedback they are given, like with like. 
The timing and posting rules governing feedback g iving in  eBay‟s conventional feedback system 
facilitate  reciprocity  and  strategic  responses  to  reciprocity.  This  has  both  negative  and  positive 
consequences for the system. On the negative side, reciprocity distorts the production and content 
of  feedback  information  in  individual  interactions  (Section  II.2).  On  the  aggregate  level,  these 
prospects  of  positive  reciprocal  and  negative  retaliatory  feedback  may  lead  to  „overly‟  positive 
feedback, hampering the informativeness of the system. The fact that from all 742,829 eBay users in 
Dataset 1 who received at least one feedback, 67% have a percentage positive of 100%, and 80.5% 
have  a  percentage  positive  of  greater  than  99%  provides  suggestive  support  for  the  bias.  The 
observation is in line with other eBay research suggesting that feedback is „overly‟ positive,
17 and also 
with a general tendency for lenient and compressed performance ratings, as discussed for instance in 
the literature on the “leniency bias” and “centrality bias” in personnel economics (Bretz, Milkovich, 
and Read, 1992; Prendergast and Topel, 1993; Prendergast, 1999). On the positive side, reciprocity 
                                                                                                                                                             
from eBay seller conferences. There are basically four themes: 1) The buyer purchases the item, but never sends the 
payment, which incurs time costs on the seller as well as fees to eBay. 2) The buyer has unsubstantiated complains about 
the item. 3) The buyer blackmails the seller regarding feedback. Stories exist where the buyer asked for a second item for 
free, threatening negative feedback if this wish would not be fulfilled. 4) After two months the buyer asks the credit card 
provider to retrieve the payment (eBay‟s payment service PayPal does not provide support in these cases). 
16 Another advantage is that we can fine tune the scaling of the new ratings without disrupting the 3 -point conventional 
ratings; the latter would create a number of path dependency problems. Rese arch in psychology suggests that Likert 
scaling of 5 or 7 points is optimal ( e.g., Nunnally, 1978; and more recently Muniz, Garcia-Cueto, and Lozano, 2005). 
Additionally, several studies have found that users generally prefer to rate on more categories rather than submitting just 
one general rating (e.g., Oppenheim, 2000). The specific method for posting detailed seller ratings is best understood in 
the context of a number of practical considerations and is described at the beginning of Section V. 
17 Dellarocas and Wood (2008) examine the information hidden in the cases where feedback is not given. They estimate 
that buyers are at least mildly dissatisfied in about 21% of all eBay transactions, far higher than the levels suggested by 
the reported feedback. Similarly, in a controlled field experiment conducted on eBay with experienced eBay traders, 
Bolton and Ockenfels (2008) found that sellers, who did not share the gains from trade in a fair manner, received 
significantly less feedback than sellers who offered buyers a fair outcome. 9 
appears to be an important motivator in getting mutually satisfactory trades reported. The blind 
conventional feedback proposal alters the sequential, open feedback rule, while the DSR proposal 
creates an asymmetry in the system so that sellers do not have the opportunity to retaliate the more 
detailed rating. Each has risks of generating adverse side effects concerning, respectively, the amount 
or consistency of feedback given. 
 
III.  Evidence from other Internet markets  
As a first step in evaluating the two proposals (Section II.3), we searched for and examined 
systems involving blind and one-sided feedback in other Internet markets. 
The first evidence comes from eBay‟s own market in Brazil. MercadoLivre began in 1999 as an 
independent  market,  eBay-like  in  its  objective  but  with  some  unique  trading  procedures.  EBay 
bought  the  market  in  2001  and  decided  to  keep  some  procedures,  including  a  blind  feedback 
system.
18 MercadoLivre reveals submitted feedback  after a 21-day “blind period” that starts upon 
completion of the transaction. No feedback can be given after the blind period has lapsed. 
TABLE 2: FEEDBACK FREQUENCY, CONTENT AND CORRELATION ON MERCADO LIVRE 
AND EBAY CHINA COMPARED TO OTHER EBAY PLATFORMS 
    Feedback 
frequency   
problematic FB 
given by    FB Content 
Correlation 
  FB Giving 
Correlation 
  N  Buyer  Seller    Buyer  Seller    Kendall's tau    Kendall's tau 
eBay U.S.  10,169  74.8%  76.7%      1.4%    1.2%    0.720    0.595 
eBay Germany  14,297  77.3%  76.9%      1.9%    1.1%    0.621    0.623 
eBay China    2,011    9.3%  19.7%      5.0%    6.7%    0.576    0.652 
… verified buyers    1,062  15.0%  13.6%      5,0%    4.9%    0.576    0.682 
… unverified buyers      949    3.1%    3.6%      14.7%        0.460 
MercadoLivre Brazil    1,958  71.1%  87.9%    18.7%  29.2%    0.785    0.175 
Note: All correlations are highly significant. 
 
Table 2 shows feedback statistics based on a total of 24,435 completed transactions in Dataset 3, 
which was specifically compiled to compare feedback behavior  in eBay‟s conventional feedback 
system to other eBay sites like MercadoLivre and eBay China, which we will come back to in the 
next section (see Appendix A.3 for a detailed description of this dataset).
 19 Observe that the share of 
problematic (negative, neutral, and withdrawn) feedback given on MercadoLivre is multiple times 
                                                 
18 Hortaçsu, Martínez-Jerez, and Douglas (2009) compare bidding behavior on different MercadoLivre sites and eBay. 
19 MercadoLivre posts only the day of feedback provision, but not the time, and also updates this date stamp when 
further verbal comments are left. For this reason we cannot provide information on whether buyer or seller left feedback 
first. 10 
higher than on other mature eBay platforms that do not employ a blind feedback system, strongly 
suggesting that blindness indeed affects the feedback distribution. Moreover, while the correlation of 
feedback content differs little from that in other markets (Column 5 in Table 2), the correlation of 
feedback giving is much lower in Brazil than in the U.S., Germany, or China (Column 6 in Table 2). 
That is, in those cases where both transaction partners leave feedback, the content in Brazil is as 
correlated as in the other countries, but the probability of two-way feedback giving is much smaller. 
One worry with a blind system is that diminishing reciprocal opportunities might diminish the 
rate at which traders leave feedback. But on MercadoLivre there is no evidence that the blind system 
decreases participation; the feedback frequency of 70% for buyers is in line with what we observe in 
other countries, and with 87.9% sellers provide even more feedback.  
Overall, the data seem to suggest that the blind system generates a more accurate, or at least a 
more dispersed reflection of trader satisfaction on both sides of the market. However, as with every 
comparison across markets, there are a number of potentially confounding effects complicating the 
comparison. We will discuss this issue at the end of the section, when we have presented the data 
from other field comparisons.  
The RentACoder.com site enables software coders to bid for contracts offered by software buyers. 
RentACoder.com used to have a two-sided, open feedback system, similar to eBay, but switched to a 
blind system in April 2005. RentACoder‟s motive for the switch (as stated on its help page) is the 
potential  threat of retaliatory  feedback in  an open system. The blind  system  allows buyers and 
coders to leave feedback on one another within a period of two weeks after completion of a project. 
The RentACoder.com panel data (Dataset 4, see Appendix A.4) comprises 192,392 transactions. 
Unlike the MercadoLivre comparison, it allows for a within site comparison, keeping all institutions 
but the feedback system fixed, and allowing an analysis of the transition from an open to a blind 
system.  The transition has  no  significant  effect on average  feedback  content received by  either 
buyers or sellers, although there is a weakly significant, small increase in the standard deviation of 
feedback  received  by  buyers.
20  There  are,  however,  other  effects  indicative  of  diminishing 
reciprocity. First, as shown in Figure 2, the monthly correlation between feedback content sharply 
and significantly drops from an average of 0.62 in the 15 months before the change to 0.21 in the 21 
months after the change. We also  observe from  Figure 2 (and backed by time series regressions  
                                                 
20 Because of space limitations, we omit here the regressions of time series of monthly averages on constant, time trend 
and blindness dummy, which confirm the observation. 11 
controlling  for  trends),  that  coders  get  significantly  less  feedback  after  introduction  of  blind 
feedback,  while  buyers  get  a  small  but  significant  increase.  Overall,  the  patterns  of  reduced 
interdependencies of feedback giving and content seem to suggest that feedback might be more 
informative.  At  the  same  time,  however,  there  is  some  evidence  from  RentACoder.com  that 
feedback frequency may be negatively affected by a blind system. 
FIGURE 2: FEEDBACK FREQUENCY AND CORRELATIONS BEFORE AND 
AFTER THE SYSTEM CHANGE IN APRIL 2005 ON RENTACODER.COM 
 
 
The hypothesis that diminishing reciprocity diminishes feedback giving finds further support by 
looking at systems with one-way feedback characteristics. The first evidence comes from a kind of 
within platform comparison on the Chinese eBay site, where there is a large proportion of so-called 
“unverified  buyers.”  Feedback  given  by  unverified  buyers  does  not  count  towards  the  seller‟s 
reputation. From a reciprocity perspective, giving feedback to unverified buyers is not unlike giving 
one-sided feedback. Table 2 shows frequency and content of feedback for verified and unverified 
buyers. We observe that verified buyers receive and give about five times as much feedback as 
unverified buyers (χ
2=82.6, p<0.001) and that feedback giving is much more correlated with verified 
buyers (the correlation coefficients are 0.460 versus 0.682).
21  
                                                 
21 Moreover, unverified buyers receive a neutral or negative feedback with probability 14.7% in our sample, whereas 
verified  buyers  only  receive  a  negative  feedback  with  probability  4.9%  (due  to  low  feedback  frequency,  χ2=2.82, 
p=0.093), suggesting that a one-sided system will elicit less positive (and probably more accurate feedback) feedback. 
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Frequency of FB received by Coders Frequency of FB received by buyers12 
More evidence comes from Amazon.de, which has a one-sided buyer-to-seller feedback system 
(Dataset 5, a sample of 320,609 feedbacks).
22 In addition, we conducted a small email-based survey 
with a subset of sellers in our sample (see Appendix A.5 for details on data set and survey ). Taking 
the survey responses of 91 Amazon sellers and the field data together, we find that feedback is left 
by buyers in 41% of transactions; if we weight the answers by number of transactions, we get a 36% 
figure (implying that very active sellers get somewhat less feedback), about half the rate of feedback 
on the various  eBay platforms.
23 So, overall, the evidence suggests that the scope for reciprocity 
affects the decision to give feedback. 
While the analysis of the field data sets is suggestive of how the proposed solutions may affect 
reciprocal feedback and feedback giving , they also raise a number of questions. Given the highly 
complex environments these markets operate in, it is difficult to make clear causal inferences.  For 
instance, the low level of positive feedback in MercadoLivre may  stem from uncontrolled cross-
country effects  regarding  different norms of  trading  or  feedback giving,  or  from  differently 
developed payment or postal services . Similarly, a comparison of  RentACoder.com with eBay is 
complicated by the fact that  the RentACoder.com feedback is on a 10 -point scale, the  market is 
smaller, the bidding process and price mechanism are different (coders bid for contracts and buyers 
do not need to select the lowest price offer),  and the networking and trading patterns are likely to 
differ (e.g., there is likely to be little overlap between program buyers and programmers).  
Along the same lines, the field data provide no direct evidence that the reduction in reciprocity 
improves either the informativeness of feedback or market efficiency. One reason to wonder is that 
the market in the sample closest to the eBay markets in question, MercadoLivre, exhibits a far higher 
rate of negative feedback than any other market.
24 Another reason is the  relatively low rates of 
feedback giving in some of the markets with blind or one -sided feedback: a substantial drop in 
feedback giving might raise its own credibility issues, effectively substituting one trust problem for 
                                                                                                                                                             
trading and communication norms on the site or to have less long-term interests on the site and so have less incentive to 
build up a good reputation.  
22 Strictly speaking, both sellers and buyers on Amazon are able to submit feed back on each other. However, feedback 
given to buyers is not accessible to other sellers, while feedback to sellers is published publicly. As a result, sellers 
typically do not leave feedback. This makes Amazon‟s system effectively a one-sided one. 
23 We also observe that Amazon feedback is more discriminative than eBay conventional feedback in the sense that only 
81.5% of feedback is given in the best category of 5, while middle and low feedback of 4, 3, 2, and 1 is given in 14.5%, 
2.2%, 1.0%, and 0.9% of all cases, respectively. 
24 One response to this concern is that the rate of negative feedback on MercadoLivre accords well with rates of 
unhappiness uncover by research (ex., Dellarocas and Wood, 2008). However, as the experiment reported in the next 
section makes clear, we should expect more informative feedback to ignite a number of endogenous effects in the 
system,  starting  with  buyers  better  indentifying  and  shunning  untrustworthy  sellers,  and  so  the  proportion  of 
unsatisfactory trades should be something less than the present rate of unhappiness. 13 
another. With the exception of RentACoder.com, there is little in the way of before and after data to 
guide such an analysis.  
Finally,  the  one-sided proposal, which combines eBay‟s conventional  feedback with detailed 
seller ratings, has no precedent in Internet markets. One of the major arguments for this proposal is 
that it represents a more modest shift from the existing system than does the blind proposal or truly 
one-sided systems such as Amazon‟s. At the same time, it runs its own unique risk in that, under the 
system, conventional feedback might diverge from the new, more detailed feedback. Again, this 
might lead to a loss in credibility. 
 
IV.  Evidence from a laboratory study 
The  questions  posed  at  the  end  of  Section  III  stem  from  two  problems  in  evaluating  the 
proposed redesigns on field data alone; problems that we address with an experiment. The first 
problem is one of comparison. The Internet markets in our data set differ in ways that complicate a 
direct comparison of feedback systems; in the case of the proposed detailed seller rating system, 
there is arguably no comparable system in use at all. The experiment is designed as a level playing 
field for comparing the performance of the different feedback system designs, holding the market 
environment constant. By the same token, the various experimental controls help us isolating the 
role  of  reciprocity  for  feedback  giving  and  establishing  causal  relationships  between  feedback 
institutions and market behavior. The second problem is one of measurement. The complexity of 
field Internet markets is such that we have at best indirect measures for feedback informativeness 
and market efficiency. The experiment provides direct performance measures.  
Subsection  IV.1  outlines  the  experimental  design.  Subsection  IV.2  sketches,  with  a  simple 
model,  the  performance  changes  we  were  expecting  to  follow  from  a  reduction  of  feedback 
reciprocity, and also helps organize the data analysis. Subsection IV.3 shows that the laboratory 
feedback behavior we observe mirrors key field observations from the conventional system, and that 
different systems lead to different feedback behaviors. Subsection IV.4 measures the impact of the 
feedback system on the economic performance of the auction market. Subsection IV.5 shows how 




IV.1 Experimental Design  
The  experiment  simulates  a  market  with  an  auction  component  (including  a  moral  hazard 
element) that was held fixed across all treatments, and a feedback component that was varied to 
capture the various scopes for reciprocity across the alternative systems.
25  
Auction component. Each treatment simulates a market that consists of 60 rounds. In each round 
participants are matched in groups of four, one  seller and three potential buyers. Each buyer i 
receives a private valuation for the good, vi, publicly known to be independently drawn from a 
uniform distribution of integers between 100 and 300 ECU (Experimental Currency Units). Buyers 
simultaneously submit bids of at least 100 ECU or withdraw from bidding. The bidder with the 
highest bid (earliest bid in case of a tie) wins the auction and pays a price p equal to the second 
highest bid plus a 1 ECU increment, or his own bid, whichever is smaller. If there is only one bid, 
the price is set to the 100 ECU start price. After the auction, all participants in the group  are 
informed of the price and of all bids but the highest.
26 The price is shown to the seller s who then 
determines the quality of the good qs   {0, .01, …, .99, 1}.
27 The payoff (not including feedback costs 
described below) to the seller is πS = p – 100qs and to the winning buyer i is πi = qsvi – p. 
Eight  sequences  of  random  parameters  (valuations,  role  and  group  matching),  involving  8 
participants each, were created in advance. Thus, random group re-matching was restricted to pools 
of 8 subjects, yielding 8 statistically independent observations per treatment. To ensure a steady 
growth  of  experience  and  feedback,  role  matching  was  additionally  restricted  such  that  each 
participant became a seller twice every 8 rounds. The same 8 random game sequences were used in 
all  treatments.  Participants  were  not  informed  about  the  matching  restriction.  There  were  32 
participants in a session and 2 sessions per treatment.  
Feedback component. When the auction ends in a trade, both buyer and seller have the opportunity to 
give  voluntary  feedback  on  the  transaction  partner.  Giving  feedback  costs  the  giver  1  ECU, 
reflecting the small effort costs when submitting feedback.  
In the Baseline treatment, both the seller and the buyer can submit conventional feedback (CF), 
rating the transaction negative, neutral, or positive. Feedback giving ends with a “soft close”: In a 
                                                 
25 See Appendix B.1 for a translation of experimental instructions. 
26 For simplicity, we chose a sealed-bid format and abstracted away from eBay‟s bidding dynamics, which is known to 
create incentives for strategic timing in bidding (Roth and Ockenfels, 2002). Other features such as the handling of 
increments and the information feedback are chosen analogously to eBay‟s rules. 
27 In the experiment, sellers were asked to choose an integer between 0% and 100%.  Proportions simplify the notation. 15 
first stage, both transaction partners have the opportunity to give feedback. If both or neither give 
feedback, then both are informed about the outcome and the feedback stage ends. If only one gives 
feedback, the other is informed about that feedback and enters the second feedback stage where he 
has again the option to give feedback, and so a chance to react to the other‟s feedback.
28 As on eBay, 
a trader‟s conventional feedback is aggregated over both buyer and seller roles as the feedback score 
and the percentage of positive feedbacks (Section II). When the participant becomes a seller, these 
scores are presented to potential buyers on the auction screen prior to bidding. 
The Blind treatment differs from the Baseline only in that we omit the second feedback stage. 
That is, buyer and seller give feedback simultaneously, not knowing the other‟s choice. 
The DSR (Detailed Seller Rating) treatment adds a rating to the Baseline treatment feedback 
system. After giving CF, the buyer (and only the buyer) is asked to rate the statement “The quality 
was satisfactory” on a 5-point Likert scale: “I don‟t agree at all”, “I don‟t agree”, “I am undecided”, 
“I agree”, “I agree completely”. As in the Baseline treatment, we implement a soft close design, but in 
case  the  seller  delays  and  enters  the  second  feedback  stage,  she  is  only  informed  about  the 
conventional feedback given by the buyer, not about the detailed quality rating. Number and average 
of received detailed seller ratings are displayed at the auction page.  
All  sessions  took  place  in  April  2007  in  the  Cologne  Laboratory  for  Economic  Research. 
Participants  were  recruited  using  an  Online  Recruitment  System  (Greiner,  2004).  Overall  192 
students participated in 6 sessions. After reading instructions and asking questions, participants took 
part in two practice rounds (see Appendix B). Each participant received a starting balance of 1,000 
ECU  to  cover  potential  losses.  Sessions  lasted  between  1½  and  2  hours.  At  the  end  of  the 
experiment, the ECU balance was converted to Euros at a rate of 200 ECU=1 Euro, and was paid 
out in cash. Participants earned 17.55 Euros on average (standard deviation = 2.84), including a 
show-up fee of 2.50 Euros and 4 Euros bonus for filling in a post-experiment questionnaire. 
The experiment is designed to isolate the reciprocal relationship between traders. In particular, 
the  experiment  abstracts away  from any buyer  moral  hazard: each  winning bid  is automatically 
transferred to the seller. Thus, the feedback given by sellers to buyers is not informative, because it 
cannot represent reputational information on the trader‟s behavior as a seller.
29 Yet, as on eBay, 
                                                 
28  Klein  et.al.  (2007),  as  well  as  our  data,  support  this  characterization  of  the  conventional  eBay  system.  Ariely, 
Ockenfels, and Roth (2005) and Ockenfels and Roth (2006) model the ending rule of Amazon.com auctions in a similar 
way, allowing buyers to always respond to other bids. 
29 Insofar buying behavior is uncorrelated with selling behavior, this also holds for eBay.  16 
leaving feedback on a buyer may affect the buyer‟s future profits  as a seller, because a trader‟s 
reputation depends on feedback earned both as a buyer and a seller. So positive feedback may be 
effectively rewarded and negative feedback may be retaliated. 
VI.2 A characterization of how reciprocal feedback may affect market outcomes 
Towards clarifying  our hypotheses, we  sketch  a simple model that characterizes how  a less 
reciprocal feedback system might improve market efficiency in the experiment. A full-fledged theory 
of reputation production and reputation building being beyond the scope of the present study, we 
assume  away  several  complexities  and  do  not  explicitly  model  the  underlying  motivational 
mechanisms for reciprocity. We concentrate instead on what we believe captures the essence of the 
effect of distorted feedback on economic efficiency both in the lab and on eBay. 
The experiment has a finite number of trading rounds. Assuming that all agents are commonly 
known to be selfish and rational, the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium in all treatments of the 
experiment stipulates zero feedback giving and quality tendered, with no auction bids. The socially 
efficient outcome has the bidder with the highest valuation winning the auction, the seller producing 
100% quality, with no (costly) feedback giving. So both of these, rather extreme, scenarios leave no 
role for the feedback system. If, as seems more likely, feedback is used to build up reputation and to 
discriminate between sellers, we hypothesize that reciprocal feedback hampers market efficiency 
because  reciprocity  compresses  reputation  scores  in  a  way  that  makes  it  harder  for  buyers  to 
discriminate  between  sellers;  these  sellers  then  have  less  incentive  to  deliver  good  quality. 
Consequently, the two proposed redesigns, if they diminish the role of reciprocity, should do better.  
To fix ideas (and extending the notation established in Section VI.1), suppose that a seller‟s 
reputation is given by a feedback score rs , which we normalize to be between [0,1]. In our laboratory 
private-value auction context, a rational, risk-neutral bidder i then bids bi = q
e(rs )vi , where q
e(rs ) is the 
expected quality given the seller‟s feedback score rs . 
For simplicity, we assume that, after all sales, the seller chooses the same quality (so we ignore 
endgame effects). Then the question for the seller is to set the optimal (stationary) shipping policy, 
qs . Define „perfectly discriminative‟ scoring as a strictly monotonic relationship between rs and qs , so 
that a score reveals a seller‟s shipping policy; e.g., q
e(rs(qs )) = qs . Under perfectly discriminative 
scoring with n bidders, with normalized private values [0,vH], and cost cqs to ship quality qs , a profit-
maximizing seller chooses qs to maximize 
((n – 1)/(n + 1)) q
e(rs(qs )) vH  – cqs = ((n – 1)/(n + 1)) qs vH  – cqs . 17 
Inspection shows that, for c not too high, a seller‟s optimal choice is full quality, qs = 1. That is, a 
feedback  system  that  generates  perfectly  discriminative  scores  can  effectively  cope  with  moral 
hazard and adverse selection problems.
30 
Reciprocal feedback in our context implies that the reputation score tends to be biased upwards. 
The simplest way to capture this distortion, is to write the relationship between rs and qs as  
rs(qs) = a + ((1 – a)/ (1 – b)) qs for qs < 1 – b and some a, b є (0,1), and 1 otherwise. 
Both a and b measure the distortion of the reputation score that comes with reciprocity compared to 
a perfect score that directly reflects quality (a = b = 0). More specifically, the parameter b describes 
the length of the interval of qualities that now all yield the maximum reputation score (rs = 1), the 
idea being that buyers are not willing to take the risk of retaliatory feedback if the quality reduction is 
sufficiently small.
31 The parameter a measures the „compression‟ of the overall range of feedback due 
to reciprocity. In our simple model, however, only the distortion that comes with b affects the 
economic performance of the market (see below), while a downscales scores without affecting the 
monotonic relationship between rs and qs.  
Returning to the seller‟s choice optimization problem, inspection shows that with reciprocal 
feedback,  the  optimal  choice(s)  for  those  who  choose  a  quality  level  below  1  –  b  remain(s) 
unchanged compared to a system  yielding  perfectly  discriminative  scores. However, all qualities 
above 1 – b are „squeezed‟ at qs = 1 – b. Consequently, the bigger the distortion b induced by 
reciprocity,  the  lower  quality  shipped,  the  lower  bids,  the  lower  prices,  and  the  lower  market 




IV.3 Feedback Behavior 
In this section, we investigate whether the feedback pattern in the Baseline treatment mirrors the 
pattern observable in the field, and how the feedback behavior in the alternative systems compares.  
                                                 
30  Moral  hazard  is  important  when  choosing  the  quality  level.  Adverse  selection  problems  may  arise  because  of 
heterogeneity in traders‟ costs or (social) preferences (not being explicitly modeled here).  
31 The fact that a large majority of eBay traders accumulated only positives (Section II) seems to support the hypothesis 
that there is too little discrimination among those with maximum scores.  
32 In our model, a reputation score gained in a system with rec iprocal feedback is less informative in the sense that it 
does not discriminate between qualities above a certain threshold. However, in equilibrium, even with reciprocity, there 
is no uncertainty about a seller‟s quality level given the reputation score. A more realistic model could add noise to the 
feedback, such that more compressed feedback makes it harder to correctly predict quality from the reputation score. 
Alternatively,  one  could  allow  some  sellers  to  be  intrinsically  motivated  to  deliver  good  quality,  regardless  of  the 
distortions in reputation scores. Such model extensions may capture the idea that reciprocity in feedback giving induces 
(more) uncertainty about a seller‟s quality.  18 
Feedback giving. In the Baseline treatment, buyers give feedback in about 80% and sellers in about 60% 
of the cases, with an average of about 70%, very similar to what is observed in the field (Section II). 
Relative to Baseline, Blind exhibits significant drops in both buyer (68%) and seller (34%) giving 
frequencies (two-tailed Wilcoxon p < 0.025 in both cases), whereas DSR exhibits only minor and 
insignificant reductions for both buyers (77%) and sellers (57%; p > 0.640 in both cases).
33  
Feedback  timing.  When  possible,  sellers  tend  to  wait  until  buyers  have  given  feedback  (Table  3; 
Wilcoxon two-tailed p < 0.025 both in Baseline and DSR). This effect is most pronounced when 
feedback is mutually neutral/negative; the only case with buyers more often moving second is – like 
in the field data – when the buyer gives a problematic and the seller a positive conventional feedback 
(see Table 11 in Appendix C for details).  
 
TABLE 3: TIMING OF FEEDBACK  
  Baseline  Blind  DSR 
Both first round  27%  26%  29% 
None first round  16%  24%  15% 
Seller 1st, buyer in 2nd    4%      2% 
Seller 1st, Buyer not (in 2nd)    5%    8%    8% 
Buyer 1st, seller in 2nd  24%    17% 
Buyer 1st, Seller not (in 2nd)  23%  42%  28% 
 
 
Feedback content. Table 4 shows correlations between conventional feedbacks across treatments. We 
find that blindness of feedback significantly decreases the correlation compared to the open systems. 
The high correlations in the latter are mainly driven by the cases where sellers delay their feedback 
and give second, while when both transaction partners give feedback in the first stage, correlations 
are comparable to blind feedback. However, correlations of simultaneously submitted feedback are 
significantly different from zero, too.  
                                                 
33  Regression  analysis  considering  interaction  effects  of  treatments  with  quality  support  the  finding  (Table  10  in 
Appendix C) and furthermore show that buyers give significantly more often feedback when quality is low in both 
alternative designs. We discuss feedback giving correlations below. 19 
TABLE 4: KENDALL TAU CORRELATIONS 
BETWEEN SELLER AND BUYER FEEDBACK BY TIMING 
  Both 1st  S 1st, B 2nd  B 1st, S 2nd  All 
Baseline  0.359  0.536  0.901  0.680 
Blind        0.411 
DSR  0.533  0.730†  0.913  0.759 
Note: All correlations highly significant at the 0.1% level, except for cell 
indicated by † which is weakly significant at the 10% level. 
 
Negative feedback. Finally, the probit regression in Table 5 shows the determinants of problematic 
feedback given to sellers conditional on the buyer giving feedback (where problematic feedback is 
defined as either a negative or neutral conventional feedback or a detailed seller rating of 3 or less). 
Controlling for quality, price and other factors, we see that problematic feedback increases in both 
Blind  and  DSR.  The  coefficient  estimates  for  the  two  treatment  dummies  are  nearly  identical, 
indicating that the size of the effect is about the same in both treatments.
34  
TABLE 5: DETERMINANTS OF PROBLEMATIC FEEDBACK, PROBIT COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES 
(ROBUST STANDARD ERRORS CLUSTERED ON MATCHING GROUP, ROUNDS 1 TO 50) 
Dep var  Buyer gives problematic feedback 
  Coeff  (StdErr) 
Constant  2.770 ***  (0.538) 
Blind  0.414 **  (0.204) 
DSR  0.417 **  (0.197) 
      
Round  -0.010 **  (0.004) 
Price  0.004 ***  (0.001) 
Quality  -0.047 ***  (0.008) 
S Feedback Score  -0.031   (0.021) 
      
N  1725    
Restricted LL  -558.8    
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% level, respectively. Blind and DSR are treatment dummies. 
S Feedback Score denotes the feedback score of the seller. 
 
The reason for more negative feedback is that buyers receiving poor quality are more likely to 
give problematic feedback under the alternative systems. More specifically, Figure 3 illustrates that in 
all treatments, a positive conventional feedback (and the highest DSR) is awarded for quality of 
100%;  likewise,  very  low  quality  receives  negative  feedback  in  all  cases.  The  major  difference 
between the treatments happens between 40% and 99% quality; here average conventional feedback 
                                                 
34 The same probit, run on all successful auction data (so not conditional on the buyer giving feedback) yields similar 
results save the coefficient for the  Blind treatment is somewhat smaller (still positive) but insignificant, most likely 
because of the drop in feedback frequency we observed earlier for that treatment. 20 
given is tougher in Blind and DSR. In this range, conventional feedback given in DSR is not quite as 
tough, but observe that the DSRs given generally line up well the Blind conventional feedback; that 
is, the DSRs reflect similar, tougher buyer standards as those revealed in Blind. 
FIGURE 3: AVERAGE FEEDBACK GIVEN AFTER OBSERVING QUALITY 
 
Summing up, the Baseline treatment replicates in considerable detail the qualitative pattern of 
strategic timing, retaliation and correlation of feedback found on eBay.
35 Moreover, as predicted, the 
alternative systems successfully mitigate reciprocity (as shown, for instance, by reduced correlations 
of feedback content) and so allow for a more negative response to lower quality.  
 
IV.4  Quality, Prices, and Efficiency 
The hypothesis underlying our redesign efforts is that the extent to which feedback is shaped by 
reciprocity affects economic outcomes. More specifically, following the model sketched in Section 
IV.2, we hypothesize that diminishing the role of reciprocity increases quality, prices and efficiency. 
Figure 4 shows the evolution of quality and auction prices over time: both quality and prices are 
higher in both DSR and Blind than in Baseline. Applying a one-tailed Wilcoxon test using independent  
                                                 
35 There are only two major exceptions. First, there is no endgame effect in the field, because there is no endgame. 
Second, we have much more negative feedback in all our treatments compared to eBay. This is wanted, because given 
the rareness of negatives on eBay it would otherwise be difficult to study reciprocal feedback giving and especially 
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TABLE 6: DETERMINANTS OF QUALITY AND PRICE, TOBIT COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES 
(ROBUST STANDARD ERRORS CLUSTERED ON MATCHING GROUP, ROUNDS 1 TO 50) 
Dep var  Quality    Price 
Model  1    2    1    2 
  Coeff  (StdErr)   Coeff  (StdErr)   Coeff  (StdErr)   Coeff  (StdErr) 
Constant  36.59 ***  (9.659)    45.75 ***  (9.053)    158.85 ***  (5.923)    166.93 ***  (4.795) 
Blind  20.75 ***  (7.813)            20.22 **  (8.685)        
DSR  21.27 ***  (5.105)           12.57 **  (6.321)        
Round  -1.17 ***  (0.186)    -1.13 ***  (0.210)    -1.24 ***  (0.144)    -1.18 ***  (0.157) 
                           
S FScore         3.85 ***  (0.977)           5.63 ***  (0.944) 
   S FScore*Blind         3.38 **  (1.696)           3.41 ***  (0.807) 
   S FScore*DSR         1.05   (1.200)           -0.604   (1.013) 
S DSR Avg          6.22 ***  (1.970)           3.75 **  (1.847) 
                           
Price  0.216 ***  (0.045)    0.222 ***  (0.045)               
                           
N  2283    2283    2283    2283 
Restricted LL  -7944.2    -7933.2    -11032.8    -11038.7 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Blind and DSR are treatment 
dummies. S FScore denotes the (conventional) feedback score of the seller, and S DSR Avg the seller‟s average 
DSR score. 
 
matching group averages, the increases in average quality and price over all rounds are significant for 
treatment DSR (p = 0.035 and 0.025, respectively), but not for Blind. The test, however, aggregates 
over all rounds, and there is a sharp end game effect in all treatments, with both quality and prices 
falling towards zero, consistent with related studies on reputation building in markets.
36 Regressions 
controlling for round and end game effects yield strong and significant positive treatment effects 
                                                 




















































regarding bids and quality for both DSR and Blind, with similar magnitude (see Price Model 1 and 
Quality Model 1 in Table 6). 
The choice of bid and quality levels affects efficiency. In the Baseline treatment, 47% of the 
potential value was realized, with losses of 23% and 31% resulting from misallocation and low 
quality, respectively.
37 Both alternative systems increase efficiency, yet only  DSR does significantly 
so; there is a 27% increase in efficiency in DSR (p = 0.027) compared to Baseline, and a 16% increase 
in Blind (p = 0.320).
38 Both market sides gain (although not significantly so) in the new system: about 
45% (56%) of the efficiency gains end up in the sellers‟ pockets in DSR (Blind), and the rest goes to 
buyers. So both alternative systems increase price, quality and efficiency. DSR improvements are 
economically and statistically significant, while efficiency improvement in Blind is not significant. 
 
IV.5  The relationship between feedback informativeness and improvement in market performance 
We have seen in Subsection IV.3 that the alternative systems lead to less reciprocal feedback, 
and in Subsection IV.4 that they lead to improved market outcomes. But how does less reciprocity 
actually translate into better market performance? The natural hypothesis is that, for a given quality, 
less reciprocity in feedback giving generates reputation scores that allow better forecasting of sellers‟ 
future behavior (see the model in Subsection IV.2). That this is so is evident from Quality Model 2 
in Table 6. The model shows that seller conventional feedback scores in Blind have significantly 
higher positive correlation with the quality the seller provides at that point then is the case in Baseline. 
The positive correlation between quality and conventional feedback scores increases in DSR as well, 
but not significantly so. Observe, however, that the DSRs are significantly positively correlated with 
quality and so, in this sense, the DSR seller scores, as well as those in Blind, exhibit less distortion 
than those in Baseline.  
We expect that introducing one of the alternative systems leads sellers to react to better feedback 
informativeness by shipping higher quality in Blind and DSR compared to Baseline (see the model in 
Subsection IV.2). Returning again to Table 6, the Price Model 2 shows that nominally equivalent 
                                                 
37 A misallocation  occurs if the bidder with the highest valuation does not  win  so  that  welfare is reduced by the 
difference between the highest valuation and the winner‟s valuation (which we define as the seller‟s opportunity cost of 
100 when there is no winner because of lack of bids). Low quality leads to an efficiency loss because each percent quality 
the seller does not deliver reduces welfare gains by one percent of the auction winner‟s valuation, minus one. Also, each 
feedback reduces welfare by 1 ECU, but this source of efficiency loss is negligible as in no treatment feedback costs 
exceed 1% of maximal efficiency. 
38  Reported  p-values  are  from  a  one-tailed  Wilcoxon  matched  pairs  signed  ranks  test  on  fully  independent  group 
averages.  23 
conventional  feedback  scores  in  Baseline  and  Blind  lead  to  higher  prices  in  the  latter  case.  In 
comparing Baseline and DSR, there is little difference in regard to conventional feedback impact on 
price; however, DSRs are significantly positively correlated with price, and in this sense sellers with 
good feedback scores are more highly rewarded in DSR than in Baseline.  
More evidence comes from looking directly at the effect a quality decision has on a seller‟s future 
average profit. Model 1 in Table 7 shows that the amount of quality a Baseline seller chooses in the 
present round drives up future average profit, but not significantly so. In contrast, the amount of 
quality  a  Blind  or  DSR  seller  chooses  drives  up  their  future  expected  profit  by  a  higher  and 
significant amount, and by about the same amount for both treatments.
39  
 
TABLE 7: DETERMINANTS OF SELLER AVERAGE PROFIT, TOBIT COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES 
(ROBUST STANDARD ERRORS CLUSTERED ON MATCHING GROUP, ROUNDS 1 TO 50) 
Dep var  Seller average future profit 
Model  1    2 
  Coeff  (StdErr)    Coeff  (StdErr) 
Constant  73.61 ***  (4.128)    70.45 ***  (4.442) 
             
S FScore         3.04 ***  (0.489) 
   S FScore*Blind         1.36 *  (0.748) 
   S FScore*DSR         -2.30 ***  (0.763) 
S DSR Avg         3.92 ***  (1.083) 
             
Quality*Baseline  0.079   (0.083)    -0.019   (0.056) 
Quality*Blind  0.175 **  (0.082)    0.098   (0.062) 
Quality*DSR  0.179 ***  (0.0478)    0.034   (0.042) 
Nosale  -53.92 ***  (5.00)    -43.75 ***  (6.533) 
             
N  2400    2400 
Restricted LL  -11398.2    -11180.5 
Note:  *,  **,  and  ***  indicate  significance  at  the  10%,  5%  and  1%  level, 
respectively.  Blind  and  DSR  are  treatment  dummies.  S  FScore  denotes  the 
feedback score of the seller, and S DSR Avg the average DSR score. The Period 
variable is omitted because the associated coefficient is small and insignificant. 
 
To conclude, the experiment mirrors the feedback pattern on eBay pretty well. This gives us 
confidence that the experiment captures relevant aspects of the field behavior – even though it 
abstracts away from buyer moral hazard and other features such as mutual feedback withdrawal that 
                                                 
39 As a side note, observe that Model 2 in Table 7 shows that knowing a seller‟s feedback score has greater value for 
forecasting a seller‟s future average profit than does knowing the quality decision they make in the present round, in all 
three treatments. That is, a summary statistic of a seller‟s feedback history is a better predictor of his future profitability 
than observing directly what he did in the present. 24 
may confound the analysis of feedback giving in the field. Data from other market platforms such as 
RentACoder.com and MercadoLivre suggest that, in particular, blindness might reduce feedback 
correlation and feedback giving.  The experiment replicates these findings in a highly controlled 
environment, showing that the change of institutions is in fact causal to the observations – although 
other factors like cross-cultural behavior differences may add to the field patterns. Taken together, 
the lab and field evidence thus provide a coherent picture of the role of reciprocity in feedback 
systems. In addition, the experiment complements the field data both by measuring variables that 
are unobservable in the field and by test-bedding designs that are nonexistent in the field. More 
specifically, the experiment shows that both systems significantly increase the informativeness of the 
feedback system, and how the effect is attributable to changes in feedback, bids relative to valuation, 
and product quality, most of which are difficult to observe in the field. Regarding design, DSR yields 
significant efficiency gains over the baseline treatment and does not experience a significant drop in 
the number of feedbacks. Because this is not the case for Blind, at least not significantly so, the 
experiment suggests that DSR would be the better option for a system change. 
 
V.  A first look at the field implementation of detailed seller ratings 
The  theoretical,  laboratory  and  field  analyses  described  above  suggest  that  the  DSR  system 
outperforms the traditional system and does no worse – and along some dimensions better – than a 
blind system. Because of this and because of the path dependency concerns mentioned in Section 
II.3, eBay decided to go for a detailed seller rating feedback system under the name “Feedback 2.0” 
in spring 2007.
40 Under Feedback 2.0, in addition  to the conventional feedback,  buyers can leave 
ratings in four dimensions on a 5 point scale.  These dimensions are “How accurate was the item 
description?”, “How satisfied were you with the seller‟s communication?”, “How quickly did the 
seller ship the item?”, and “How reasonable were the shipping and handling charges?” For each of 
these ratings, only the number of feedbacks and the average rating are displayed on the seller‟s 
feedback page, and only after the seller receives at least 10 ratings.
41 On the feedback submission 
page eBay emphasizes that only averages and no individual DSRs can be observed. As a result, DSR 
is not only blind (in the sense that it cannot be responded to) and one -sided (only buyers can give 
                                                 
40 EBay piloted the new design in a couple of smaller and medium size eBay markets from early March 2007 (Australia, 
Belgium, France, India, Ireland, Italy, Poland, and UK), and introduced it worldwide in the first week of May 2007. 
41 See Figures 9 and 10 in Appendix C for screen shots.  Similar to conventional feedback, DSRs are averaged for each 
buyer before being aggregated. Also, DSRs older than 12 months are ignored, yielding a „rolling‟ average. There are a 
number of other small changes implemented jointly with Feedback 2.0. For instance, information about item title and 
price were added to feedback comments received as a seller. 25 
detailed ratings), but also anonymous (sellers cannot identify the DSR provider). In this section we 
present early evidence on the performance of the new system. 
FIGURE 5: EVOLUTION OF POSITIVE, NEUTRAL, NEGATIVE AND WITHDRAWN 
FEEDBACK BEFORE AND AFTER INTRODUCTION OF FEEDBACK 2.0 
 
Notes: The figure is based on about 7 and 3 million individual feedbacks in the 30 weeks 
before and the first 10 weeks after introduction of Feedback 2.0, respectively, in the pilot 
countries Australia, Belgium, France, Poland and UK. Positive feedback is plotted on the 
left y-axis, all other feedback on the right y-axis. 
 
The first observation is that conventional feedback giving is not much affected by the system 
change. Based on Dataset 1 (see Appendix A.1), Figure 5 shows the share of positive (left y-axis) as 
well as neutral, negative and  eventually withdrawn feedback (right y-axis) for the last 30 weeks 
before and the first 10 weeks after introduction of DSR in early March 2007 (vertical dashed line). 
The shares are quite stable, with the exception of the kink about 10 weeks before the system change, 
which falls in the pre-Holiday shopping time known for high expectations and time pressure. From 
the week before to the week after DSR introduction we observe a small drop in positive and an 
accompanying rise in neutral feedback. This is in line with the experimental results on the DSR 
system, where we also observe a shift from positive to neutral feedback. However, these changes are 
small compared to the Holiday shock and overall variance, and seem not to be persistent, at least for 
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frequency, timing or correlation between the pre- and post change Datasets 1 and 2. We conclude 
that, overall, there are no or at best small short-term effects in CF due to the introduction of DSR.  
DSRs are given  in about 70% of the  cases CF is given, varying  somewhat by country and 
category. For the 27,759 eBay members from Australia, Belgium, France, Poland and UK in Dataset 
1, who received at least ten DSRs between the first week of March and data collection in May 2007 
(such that their DSR average was published on their feedback profile), we track CF received as a 
seller in the same period as well as in the two months before DSR introduction (using individual 
feedback data; see Appendix A.1 for a description). From this feedback we calculated the fictitious 
percentage positives of CF of each individual seller before and after introduction of Feedback 2.0, 
using only those feedbacks given in the corresponding time windows.  
 
FIGURE 6: DISTRIBUTION OF AVERAGE CF AND DSR SCORES IN MEMBER PROFILES 
 
Notes: DSR and Amazon.com‟s 1-5 range and CF percent positive‟s 0-100 range are divided in the 
same number of categories and are aligned at the x-axis. EBay data is based on the feedback of the 
same  27,759  members  from  Australia,  Belgium,  France,  Poland  and  UK,  received  as  seller  in 
Jan/Feb 2007 and March/Apr/May 2007, respectively. Inclusion criterion was more than 10 DSRs 
in at least one DSR category. Amazon data is based on 9,741 Amazon market place sellers. 
 
In line with Figure 5 above, Figure 6 shows that the CF percentage positives scores slightly 
decreased after introduction of the new system. However, DSRs are more nuanced. For instance, 
while most sellers have a „perfect‟ CF reputation of 100%, only very few have a „perfect‟ average 
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marketplace  sellers  in  Figure  6  (based  on  Dataset  5,  see  Appendix  A.5).  The  one-sided  DSR 
feedback  distribution  follows  the  one-sided  Amazon.com  feedback  distribution  fairly  closely, 
although it seems to be even somewhat more negative. This supports the idea that DSR is treated as 
a one-sided system, with little scope for reciprocity. In fact, Figure 7 shows that the difference in 
rating variability between CF and DSR is partly driven by a strategic response to the differences in 
the scope for reciprocal behavior. 
 
FIGURE 7: DISTRIBUTION OF CF CONDITIONAL ON  
AVERAGE OF CORRESPONDING DSRS 
 
Notes: To calculate the DSR average we take all available of the up to four DSR 
ratings per feedback, average and round to integer. Thus, a DSR average of 1 
implies two or three ratings of 1 and at most one rating of 2. 
 
Figure 7 (based on Dataset 2; see Appendix A.2 for a description) shows for each DSR average 
the  distribution  of  the  corresponding  CFs.  As  one  might  expect,  when  the  DSR  average  is  5, 
virtually all CF is positive, and when the DSR average is 4, almost all CF is positive. However, of 
those buyers who submit the minimum DSR average of 1 (that means that the buyer gave one of the 
rating combinations 1, 11, 111, 112, 1111, or 1112), about 15% submit a positive CF. For DSR 
averages of 2, this share is 30%. That is, among those who are maximally unsatisfied measured by 
DSR, which cannot be reciprocated, a substantial share expresses satisfaction with respect to CF, 
which can be reciprocated. It seems plausible that at least part of this pattern can be interpreted as 
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The  initial  concern  that  this  kind  of  strategic  hiding  behavior  might  yield  inconsistencies 
between aggregate CFs and DSRs is not borne out, however. The overall share of DSR averages of 1 
or 2 is only slightly less than 2%, so that on average, a positive CF comes with a better DSR.  
Strategic feedback hiding is only effective when the seller is not able or not willing to retaliate 
against such feedback. However, while DSR makes retaliation more difficult, one might still suspect 
that by permanently observing the changes of average ratings, a seller might be able to identify the 
buyer behind a given DSR. This hypothesis is not supported by our data. When the buyer gives an 
average DSR of 1 but a positive CF, the probability that the seller retaliates upon this with a negative 
CF is 0.004, compared to a retaliation probability of 0.468 when the CF is negative.
42 
The experiment suggests that most of the endogenous improvement in performance can be 
expected from pickier buying. In fact, there is evidence indicating that buyers are indeed more 
distinguishing under DSR. That is, sellers with a relatively good DSR score have a higher probability 
of selling listed items after introduction of DSR than the same sellers before introduction of DSR, 
and sellers with a relatively low DSR have a lower probability of selling with DSR.
43  
 
VI. Conclusions and challenges for future research 
This study is a first exploration of the market design issues surrounding the engineering of trust 
and  trustworthiness  in  the  marketplace.  The  study  illustrates  how  gaming  in  the  production  of 
reputation information can significantly hamper the ability of a reputation system to facilitate trust 
and trade efficiency. Our analysis began with the observation that reciprocity plays a major role in 
the leaving, timing and content of feedback. While retaliatory feedback is in itself a rather small 
phenomenon, accounting for less than 1.2% of the total mutual feedback data (Figure 1), the threat 
of retaliatory negative feedback distorts feedback in aggregate. The reason is that buyers respond 
strategically to the threat, either by not reporting bad experiences or waiting for the seller to report 
first.  This, in turn, reduces the informativeness of feedback information, with the end result that a 
seemingly small phenomenon can substantially hamper trust and market efficiency. 
                                                 
42 In support of this observation, straightforward regression analyses show a very high correlation between seller‟s and 
buyer‟s CF, but when controlling for the buyer‟s CF feedback, correlations with DSR are very low, or even negative. 
43 The effects are statistically highly significant, yet,  unfortunately, eBay does not allow us to document this data here, 
because it could theoretically be related to eBay‟s profits. 29 
A major challenge in solving marketplace trust problems has to do with the need to take account 
adverse platform effects that may arise from new feedback systems due to side-effects or disruption 
of path dependencies caused in the migration to a new system. For example, a redesign of a trust 
system need respect the fact that reciprocity has positive as well as negative consequences for the 
feedback  system.  The  giving  of  feedback  is  largely  a  public  good,  and  our  data  suggest  that 
reciprocity is important for getting mutually satisfactory trades recorded.  It is therefore desirable 
that, in mitigating retaliatory feedback, we strive for a targeted approach rather than an approach 
that  attempts  to  remove  all  forms  of  reciprocity.  Also,  by  nature,  reputation  mechanisms  are 
embedded in repeated games, connecting past with future behavior.  It was important to the present 
redesign to maintain certain aspects of the old system, such as the 3-point (conventional) scoring, so 
that the information collected prior to the change in the system still be useful in evaluating traders 
after the changeover, without causing undue confusion. 
Our study shows that reciprocal feedback behavior can be channeled, and in a targeted way. The 
way feedback information is navigated through the system affects  whether and how reciprocity 
influences the candor of feedback. The data show that, compared to a simple open system, both 
blindness  in  conventional  feedback  giving  and  one-sidedness  in  a  detailed  seller  rating  system 
increase the information contained in the feedback presented to buyers. As a result, the redesigns 
likely yield more trust and efficiency in the market, at least in the short-run period that we studied. 
Additional studies, particularly of longer term effects, should yield further insights.  
The laboratory and field data, along with our simple modeling approach, made for a coherent 
picture of the effects of institutional changes. However, it is the interaction of complementary lab 
and field data that allows us to be confident in our judgment about the importance of institutional 
changes.  If  we  only  had  field  data,  it would  be difficult  to  unambiguously  establish  causalities, 
because both cross- and within platform comparisons do not hold the whole relevant environment 
constant so that confounding explanations for changes in behavior may arise. While the laboratory 
experiments cannot capture the various complexities of the corresponding field environments, they 
demonstrate  (beyond their benefits as a test-bed for competing  designs) that the  interaction of 
institutions  and  reciprocity  is  sufficient  to  cause  the  robust  empirical  patterns  observed  in  the 
various data sets. This suggests that our understanding of the reputation production process might 
benefit from a more extensive game theoretic investigation, beyond our sketch of a simple model in 
Section IV.2.  Many reputation systems outside of Internet markets are susceptible to retaliation 30 
from those given a bad rating, and so we suspect that these patterns are also not unusual in non-
electronic interactions.   
EBay introduced „detailed seller ratings‟ in March and May 2007. Relative to the conventional 
feedback on eBay, this feedback is more  detailed,  one-sided and anonymous. As predicted, the 
change did not much affect conventional feedback giving, but many traders use the new system to 
avoid retaliation. This contributes to more reputation dispersion and so improved informativeness. 
Future  studies  determining  the  extent  to  which  the  individual  components  of  feedback  ratings 
(detailed, one-sided and anonymous) are a matter of some importance for the efficient application to 
other Internet and offline market feedback systems. 
Naturally,  market  platforms  like  eBay  have  to  continuously  monitor  and  improve  trust  and 
trustworthiness on their platform. Motivated by the positive effects of detailed seller ratings, eBay 
moved ahead and introduced further changes in spring 2008. The most important feature of this 
recent change is that sellers are not allowed to submit negative or neutral feedback anymore, only 
positive. Basically, this is a move to a one-sided feedback system, as found on many business-to-
consumer platforms, but still allows for positive reciprocity. Further research will be devoted to how 
this new change affects the content, timing, and informativeness of feedback. For example, one 
might expect that, contrary to their behavior in the previous design, more sellers will move first in 
feedback giving to trigger positive reciprocity. 
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APPENDICES NOT FOR PUBLICATION 
 
Appendix A.  Field data sets 
 
Summary 
Datasets 1 to 3 contain data from eBay. Dataset 1 holds data on one month of transactions on eBay (from six categories 
in seven countries) and follows their feedback in the old conventional feedback (CF) system. The data also contains 
individual feedback data from just before and after the change. Dataset 2 mirrors Dataset 1 for the young Feedback 2.0 
feedback system (DSR), about 8 months later. Dataset 3 was compiled separately to compare eBay markets with the 
traditional CF system (like Germany and the U.S.) to existing eBay markets with special institutional variations: the blind 
MercadoLivre reputation system, and the system used in eBay China, employing different feedback rules for „verified‟ 
and „unverified‟ buyers. 
Datasets  4 and  5 are compiled from  other  sources.  In Dataset 4  we collected all feedback data left until 2007 on 
RenACoder.com.  Dataset  5  is  a  snapshot  of  feedback  data  on  Amazon.de.  In  the  following  we  provide  detailed 
information on source, retrieval method, and content of our data sets. 
 
A.1 Dataset 1 – eBay transactions in Nov/Dec 2006 and corresponding feedback until March 2007. We constructed a sample 
involving about one million postings on eBay in November and December 2006. The eBay sites included in our sample 
were  ebay.benl.be,  ebay.co.uk,  ebay.com.au,  ebay.fr,  and  ebay.pl,  where  the  feedback  redesign  was  introduced  in 
beginning of March 2007, as well as ebay.com and ebay.de, with a starting date of the new system in early May 2007. We 
decided for 6 different categories, which represent products traded on eBay with different levels of heterogeneity, prices 
and average feedback: original printer cartridges (CART), new cell phones without service contract (CELL), fragrances 
(FRAG), antiques (ANTIQUES), paper money (MONEY) and amazon.(com|de|co.uk) gift certificates (AMAZ). To 
obtain transaction ids we conducted searches for all available completed eBay listings in these categories and countries at 
a  specific  date  (for  categories  AMAZ,  CELL,  CART,  MONEY  in  countries  co.uk,  com,  com.au,  de,  fr,  pl  on 
12/13/2006, for categories ANTIQUES and FRAG and country be on 12/23/2006). Then we downloaded the auction 
main pages for all these item ids from the respective country‟s eBay website, and the bid/purchase history pages from 
eBay.com, where appropriate. Auction and bid pages were parsed for all available information. In the second half of May 
2007 we downloaded the feedback profiles for all sellers and successful buyers at least back to the date of the first eBay 
listing  in  our  sample  they  were  involved  in.  If  feedback  profiles  were  invalid  or  set  to  private,  we  additionally 
downloaded the feedback giving profiles of their transaction partners. From the feedback data, we extracted the feedback 
aggregates (feedback score, %pos, number of feedbacks received, detailed seller ratings if existent, etc.) at the time of 
download as well as all individual feedbacks (feedback, time, item id, partner, comment, etc.) received/given between the 
end of listing and the feedback download. Using feedback profiles at download time and individual feedbacks received 
since listing end time, we reconstructed the feedback score and the percentage of positive feedbacks of seller and 
buyer(s) of each item at the listing end time. Furthermore, for each successful eBay transaction in our sample, we 
searched for the feedback value and times given by the transaction partners to each other. Altogether we were able to 
identify detailed feedback behavior for more than 99.8% of successful transactions in our sample. Table 8 provides 
descriptive statistics of our dataset. 
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TABLE 8: DESCRIPTIVES OF DATASET 1 
 
  Feedback and timing    Buyer’s feedback    Seller’s feedback 










first    +  0  -  B 
wd 
mut 




All  722,929  23.5  6.5  6.5  44.2  19.4    97.1  1.0  1.4  0.3  0.2    97.9  0.2  1.6  0.2 
Country                                 
Belgium  12,293  19.0  4.9  6.9  43.9  25.3    96.9  0.9  1.6  0.4  0.2    97.5  0.4  1.9  0.2 
U.K.  143,794  22.4  6.2  6.4  43.2  21.8    97.5  0.8  1.3  0.2  0.2    97.4  0.2  2.2  0.2 
U.S.  302,140  27.9  6.6  7.0  43.5  15.0    96.6  1.2  1.5  0.4  0.3    97.8  0.2  1.7  0.3 
Australia  31,978  24.1  4.6  5.6  46.7  18.9    97.4  0.9  1.2  0.3  0.2    97.9  0.2  1.7  0.2 
Germany  192,502  17.3  6.9  6.0  45.9  23.9    97.5  0.9  1.2  0.3  0.1    98.7  0.2  0.9  0.1 
France  39,088  23.5  6.4  6.0  43.3  20.8    95.9  1.4  2.0  0.4  0.3    96.5  0.5  2.7  0.3 
Poland  1,134  48.9  5.6  5.2  25.2  15.2    96.9  0.4  2.1  0.6  0.0    97.5  0.0  2.5  0.0 
Category                                 
Amaz  842  12.8  10.0  9.4  38.2  29.6    99.1  0.0  0.3  0.6  0.0    98.9  0.0  1.1  0.0 
Antiques  47,052  19.9  5.6  7.0  45.7  21.8    98.3  0.7  0.7  0.2  0.1    98.8  0.2  0.9  0.1 
Cart  16,450  11.5  6.0  6.3  45.4  30.8    98.8  0.5  0.6  0.1  0.0    99.6  0.1  0.3  0.0 
Cell  363,735  29.5  6.6  7.5  38.4  17.8    95.4  1.5  2.2  0.6  0.3    96.7  0.3  2.7  0.3 
Frag  270,798  17.9  6.6  4.9  51.8  18.7    98.3  0.7  0.8  0.2  0.1    98.9  0.2  0.8  0.1 
Money  24,052  10.6  4.4  7.0  41.5  36.5    99.5  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.0    99.7  0.0  0.2  0.0 
Notes: All shares in %. “No FB” stands for no feedback, “Only B/S” for feedback given only by 
buyer/seller,  “B/S  first”  for  feedback  given  by  both,  but  buyer/seller  first,  +/0/-  for 
positive/neutral/negative feedback, respectively. „B wd‟ denotes buyer feedback withdrawn by 
eBay, and „mut wd‟ means feedback mutually withdrawn by transaction partners. 
 
Individual eBay feedbacks until May 2007. In order to create Dataset 1 we downloaded the feedback profiles of the about 1 
million involved eBay members back to the page of their feedback profile covering the time of the first listing in our 
sample they were involved in. Profiles were downloaded in pages with 200 individual feedbacks each. All these feedback 
profiles were parsed for individual feedbacks, not necessarily directly connected to the transactions in Dataset 1. The 
same  was  done  for  the  obtained  feedback  giving  profiles.  Over  all  included  countries,  this  procedure  resulted  in 
78,045,630 individual feedbacks before the introduction of Feedback 2.0 in March/May 2007, and about 7,060,819 
individual feedbacks thereafter until May 2007, which allow us to track short-term changes in CF feedback and early 
DSR feedback scores. 
 
A.2 Dataset 2 – eBay transactions between June 1
st and June 14
th 2007 and corresponding feedback under Feedback 2.0 until September 
2007. This dataset was assembled in conjunction with eBay, and mirrors Dataset 1 for the post-Feedback 2.0 period. For 
the  same  categories  and  countries  as  in  Dataset  1,  the  data  set  includes  transaction  and  feedback  information  for 
successful transactions which have taken place in the two weeks between 06/01/2007 until 06/14/2007. (The only 
category mistakenly not included was “printer cartridges” in France.) Some categories were defined somewhat broader 
(for example, “gift certificates” instead of “amazon gift certificates”). Altogether, the set includes data from completed 
573,567 transactions and 963,925 individual feedbacks. All eBay user names were anonymized in the data, which also did 
not include any personal information. Besides the transaction and feedback details the data set includes the individual 
detailed seller ratings given by buyers, which would not be available in a downloaded dataset. In order to protect eBay‟s 
commercial interests, we are not able to report this data in such detail as for the downloaded Dataset 1. 
A.3 Dataset 3 – Feedback data from Mercado Livre, eBay China, and other eBay sites from June 2006. Between June 12th and June 
26th 2006 we elicited all offers in categories Antiques/Art, Cell phones, and Health&Beauty from eBay‟s platforms in the 36 
U.S., Germany, and China, as well as from the eBay-owned platform in Brazil, which is called Mercado Livre and active 
throughout South America. Of these listings, we selected random samples of 2%, 6%, and 20% for U.S., Germany, and 
China, respectively, and included all listings in Brazil. From these we excluded observations involving eBay members 
with “private” eBay profiles, for which feedback data could not be elicited. This procedure left us with 28,435 completed 
transactions. Table 9 shows a summary of observations. 
 
TABLE 9: DESCRIPTIVES OF DATASET 3 
Number of observations 
  Transactions  Buyer gives FB  Seller gives FB  Both give FB 
US  10,169    7,602    7,799    6,941 
Germany  14,297  11,052  10,990  10,070 
China    2,011      188      178      125 
   B unverified      949        29        34        15 
   B verified    1,062      159      144      110 
Brazil    1,958    1,394    1,721    1,276 
Buyer gives feedback … 
  Positive  Neutral  negative  withdrawn 
US    7,492    42  48  20 
Germany  10,847    73  91  41 
China      151      1    5  2 
   B unverified         
   B verified      151      1    5    2 
Brazil    1,134  172  88   
Seller gives feedback … 
  Positive  Neutral  negative  withdrawn 
US    7,704    14    74    7 
Germany  10,872    20    83  15 
China      166      2    10    0 
   B unverified        29      0      5    0 
   B verified      137      2      5    0 
Brazil    1,218  214  289   
 
A.4 Dataset 4 – Feedback data from RentACoder.com. On RentACoder.com, buyers and sellers (coders) can give feedback on 
a  10-point  scale,  along  with  verbal  comments.  In  March  2007,  we  downloaded  feedback  data  from  all  192,392 
transactions which took place between January 2004 and January 2007. In addition to feedback submitted by transaction 
partners, an arbitrator from RentACoder.com gives comments in cases where projects were not completed. We ignored 
those observations in our dataset. 
 
A.5 Dataset 5 – Feedback data from Amazon.de and survey with Amazon sellers. In May 2007 we downloaded feedback data of 
10,474 Amazon.de marketplace sellers from the Amazon.de website. Amazon‟s application programming interface (API) 
allows to request only up to 50 recent feedbacks per seller. We started with all sellers who offered the German version of 
the then popular book “Vanish” by Tess Gerritsen. The book was chosen as it was on Amazon‟s bestseller list and was 
offered by many different sellers. From these sellers we downloaded details of the 50 last feedbacks, including the item 
ids of the products they have sold. For each of these item ids, we downloaded the 50 recent feedbacks of all sellers who 
currently offered this product on Amazon.com. We repeated this process until the number of captured Amazon sellers 
hit the threshold of 10,000. Our resulting data set consists of 320,609 feedbacks given by buyers to sellers. 
Note that the API‟s restriction of 50 feedbacks per seller results in an overweighting of feedback from smaller sellers in 
our data set compared to the total amount of individual feedbacks on Amazon, but yields a representative picture of the 
performance of the average seller in recent transactions. To obtain some data on feedback frequencies and feedback 
system perceptions, in June 2007 we contacted a random sample of 590 Amazon sellers in our data set using the 
Amazon contact form, and asked them to answer three questions on frequency of buyer feedback, satisfaction with 37 
buyer feedback, and desirability of a two-sided system. 91 of the contacted sellers responded to our survey, with an 
average of 778 received feedbacks on Amazon (ranging from 1 to 10,699). 
 
Appendix B.  Laboratory experiment instructions 
Welcome and thank you for participating in this experiment. In this experiment you can earn money. The specific 
amount  depends  on  your  decisions  and  the  decisions  of  other  participants.  From  now  on  until  the  end  of  the 
experiment, please do not communicate with other participants. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. An 
experimenter will come to your place and answer your question privately. In the experiment we use ECU (Experimental 
Currency Unit) as the monetary unit. 200 ECUs are worth 1 Euro. 
At the beginning of the experiment all participants are endowed with an amount of 1000 ECU. Profits during the 
experiment will be added to this account, losses will be deducted. At the end of the experiment, the balance of the 
account will be converted from ECUs into Euros according to the conversion rate announced above, and paid out in 
cash. 
The experiment lasts for 60 rounds. In each round, participants will be matched into groups of four participants. One of 
these participants is the seller, the other three participants are buyers. The composition of the group, and in which rounds 
you are a seller and in which rounds you are a buyer will be randomly determined by the computer. The seller offers one 
good which, if produced in 100% quality, costs him 100 ECUs to produce. Each of the potential buyers is assigned a 
valuation for the good, which lies between 100 and 300 ECUs. The valuation represents the value of the good for the 
buyer if he receives it in 100% quality (more about quality will be said below). The valuations of the three buyers will be 
newly randomly drawn in each round. When drawing a valuation, every integer value between 100 and 300 has the same 
probability to be selected. 
Each round consists of three steps: in the “auction stage” the three potential buyers may bid for the item offered by the 
seller. In the “transaction stage” the seller receives the price which has to be paid by the auction winner, and decides 
about the quality of the good he will deliver. In the “feedback stage” both buyer and seller may give feedback on the 
transaction, which is then made available to traders in later rounds. In the following we explain the procedures of the 
three stages in detail. 
Auction stage. In the first stage in each round, each of the potential buyers may submit a maximum bid for the good: 
1.  Your maximum bid is the maximum amount you'd be willing to pay for winning the auction. If you do not 
want to participate in the auction, submit a maximum bid of 0. If you want to participate, submit a maximum 
bid of at least 100 ECUs, which is the minimum price. (Your maximum bid must not exceed the current 
amount on your account.) 
2.  The bidder who submits the highest maximum bid wins the auction. The price is equal to the second highest 
bid plus 1 ECU. Exceptions: The price is equal to 100 ECU if only one potential buyer submits a bid. The price 
is equal to the maximum bid of the auction winner, if the two highest maximum bids are the same (in this case, 
the bidder who has submitted his bid first wins the auction).  
3.  You may think of the bidding system as standing in for you as a bidder at a live auction. That is, the system 
places bids for you up to your maximum bid, but using only as much of your bid as is necessary to maintain 
your highest bid position. For this reason, the price cannot exceed the second highest bid plus 1 ECU. 
The winner of the auction must pay the price to the seller and proceeds to the transaction stage. All other potential 
buyers earn an income of 0 ECU in this round.  
Transaction stage. The seller receives the price and then determines the quality of the good. The quality must be between 
0% and 100%. Each quality percent costs the seller 1 ECU. Thus, the costs for the seller for selling the good are 0 ECU 
if the quality is 0%, and 100 ECU if the quality is 100%. The value of the good for the buyer who has won the auction 
equals the quality of the good times his valuation for the good. Thus the value of the good for the buyer is 0 ECU if the 
quality is 0%, and equal to his valuation if the quality is 100%. 
In equations: 
The payoff for the Seller in this round equals: Auction price – Quality [%] * 100 
The payoff for the auction winner in this round is: Quality [%] * Valuation – Auction price 
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Feedback stage 
Baseline {The feedback stage consists of one or two steps: After the transaction both the buyer and the seller decide 
whether or not they want to submit a feedback on the transaction. Submitting a feedback costs 1 ECU. The feedback 
can be either “negative“, “neutral“, or “positive“. If both transaction partners submit feedback, or none of them submits 
feedback, then the feedback stage ends at this point. 
If only one transaction partner submits feedback, then the other transaction partner is informed about this feedback. 
The transaction partner who has not submitted feedback yet has another chance to submit feedback. Again, submitting 
feedback costs 1 ECU, and the feedback can be either “negative”, “neutral”, or “positive”. 
After the feedback stage the round ends. If a participant becomes a seller in one of the following rounds, the feedbacks 
he received in earlier rounds as a buyer or a seller will be presented in the following way: “YY (XX%)“, where YY is 
equal to the number of positive feedbacks minus the number of negative feedbacks, and XX is the share (in percent) of 
positive feedbacks in all feedbacks. } 
Blind {After the transaction both the buyer and the seller decide whether or not they want to submit a feedback on the 
transaction. Submitting a feedback costs 1 ECU. The feedback can be either “negative“, “neutral“, or “positive“. The 
feedback giving of buyer and seller takes place simultaneously.  
After the feedback stage the round ends. If a participant becomes a seller in one of the following rounds, the feedbacks 
he received in earlier rounds as a buyer or a seller will be presented in the following way: “YY (XX%)“, where YY is 
equal to the number of positive feedbacks minus the number of negative feedbacks, and XX is the share (in percent) of 
positive feedbacks in all feedbacks.} 
DSR: { The feedback stage consists of one or two steps: After the transaction both the buyer and the seller decide 
whether or not they want to submit a feedback on the transaction. Submitting a feedback costs 1 ECU. The feedback 
can be either “negative“, “neutral“, or “positive“. Additionally, the buyer (and only the buyer) may submit an additional 
rating. (This is only possible if he also submits a normal feedback. The additional rating allows the buyer to give 
feedback on the following scale: 
The quality was satisfactory. 
I strongly disagree  I disagree  Undecided  I agree  I strongly agree 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
There are no additional costs for the additional rating. If both transaction partners submit feedback, or none of them 
submits feedback, then the feedback stage ends at this point. If only one transaction partner submits feedback, then the 
other transaction partner is informed about the “negative”/”neutral”/”positive” feedback; but the seller is not informed 
about the content of the additional rating submitted by the buyer. The transaction partner who has not submitted 
feedback yet has another chance to submit feedback. Again, submitting feedback costs 1 ECU, and the feedback can be 
either “negative”, “neutral”, or “positive”. 
After the feedback stage the round ends. If a participant becomes a seller in one of the following rounds, the feedbacks 
he received in earlier rounds as a buyer or a seller will be presented in the following way: “YY (XX%)“, where YY is 
equal to the number of positive feedbacks minus the number of negative feedbacks, and XX is the share (in percent) of 
positive feedbacks in all feedbacks. The additional ratings which a participant received as a seller in earlier rounds will be 
presented in the following form: “on average X.X, based on XXX additional ratings”.} 
Before you start with the experiment you will take part in two trial rounds. In the first trial round you are a buyer, in the 
second trial round you are a seller. The other buyers/the seller will be simulated by the computer in these trial rounds. 
The trial rounds have no consequences for your earnings. 
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Appendix C.  Additional tables and figures 
 
TABLE 10: DETERMINANTS OF FEEDBACK GIVING, PROBIT COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES 
(ROBUST STANDARD ERRORS CLUSTERED ON MATCHING GROUP, ROUNDS 1 TO 50) 
Dep var  Buyer gave feedback 
  Coeff  (StdErr) 
Constant  1.50 ***  (0.227) 
Blind  -0.296 **  (0.131) 
DSR  0.012   (0.157) 
      
Round  -0.008 **  (0.004) 
Price  -0.001   (0.001) 
Quality  -0.006 ***  (0.002) 
S FScore  0.120 *  (0.011) 
      
N  2283 
Restricted LL  -1226.2 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level, respectively. S FScore stands for the 
feedback score of the seller. 
 
TABLE 11: CONTENT AND TIMING OF MUTUAL FEEDBACK 
IN EXPERIMENTAL BASELINE TREATMENT 
Mutually positive feedback    Only seller gave problematic FB 
    Seller gave in stage        Seller gave in stage 
      1    2          1    2 
Buyer gave 
in stage 
1  137  79    Buyer gave 
in stage 
1    7      6 
2    16      2     
                 
Only buyer gave problematic FB    Mutually problematic feedback 
    Seller gave in stage        Seller gave in stage 
      1    2          1    2 
Buyer gave 
in stage 
1    59    3    Buyer gave 
in stage 
1  24  108 
2    11      2    8   
Note:  Numbers  in  cells  represent  absolute  numbers  of  observations  in  treatment  Baseline. 
„Problematic‟ includes negative and neutral feedback. 
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FIGURE 8: SCREENSHOT OF NEW FEEDBACK SUBMISSION PAGE ON EBAY 
 
 
FIGURE 9: SCREENSHOT OF NEW FEEDBACK PROFILE PAGE ON EBAY 
 
 